by William O. Beeman / November 24th, 2013
The principal benefit of the negotiations between Iran and the
P5+1 nations on November 23 is that Iran and the United States were able
to down to talk and reach an agreement on
something. Given 33
years of estrangement and non-communication, this is an extraordinarily
important development — nearly equivalent to the U.S. breakthrough to
China — perhaps the signal achievement of the Nixon administration.
The profound symbolism of the moment more than outweighs the lighter
substantive elements of the temporary agreement. The United States and
its partners appeared tough and got very little. Iran appeared tough and
gave up very little. Both sides saved face. This is the essence of a
successful agreement. No one “won” and no one “lost.”
Iranians have been both sincere and clever in the negotiations. They
played up to the insubstantial straw-man accusations promulgated by the
U.S. and its partners, making them seem weightier than they were in
reality. By yielding to the P5+1 demands, in essence Iran has allowed
itself to be persuaded to stop temporarily doing what it never intended
to do — make a nuclear weapon. The bottom line is that Iran did not give
up very much in the negotiations, (but it didn’t gain very much
either).
Reviewing the terms of the agreement in conjunction with the reality
on the ground in Iran, one can see how easy it was for Iran’s
negotiators to agree to these terms.
Low Enriched Uranium
Iran’s enrichment of uranium was the crux of the matter. The United
States and its allies had fetishized Iran’s uranium enrichment program.
They had made the improbable leap that having enriched uranium would
immediately lead to a nuclear weapon. This is an immense mistake — so
large that one must suspect that it is essentially hyped for public
consumption. The public has certainly been convinced of this.
However, Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile cannot be used for any
military purpose, short of the rather improbable construction of a
“dirty bomb” — a conventional warhead containing radioactive material,
not to explode, but to pollute. Such a primitive weapon has no practical
use. Under the agreement, Iran would cease adding to this stockpile.
Under the agreement, Iran will be allowed to continue to enrich
uranium at less than 5 percent purity — a concession that preserves
Iran’s rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to peaceful
nuclear development — its fundamental demand going into the talks.
High Enriched Uranium
Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium would be eliminated
through conversion to fuel plates for use in a research reactor or
oxidized. It could then not be further enriched or weaponized in any
way. This seems like a major concession, but when one understands why
Iran was enriching to the 20 percent level to begin with, it is less so.
Iran had a research reactor, the
Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR) that produced medical isotopes for the treatment of cancer. The
reactor had been supplied by the United States in 1967. The United
States at that time provided weapons grade fuel for running the reactor.
Iran was running out of 20 percent fuel, and was expected to deplete
the supply entirely by 2011. Iran tried to broker a deal for more 20
percent fuel with the United States. A preliminary agreement was reached
on October 1, 2010. The United States reneged on the agreement. Iran
then began enriching its own uranium to the 19.75% level — technically
below the high-enriched uranium threshold of 20%. After converting part
of this this indigenously produced fuel into non-weaponizeable reactor
plates,
it was introduced
into the TRR in February, 2012. The November 23 agreement will allow
Iran to do what it was going to do anyway, and finish converting the
rest of its 19.75 percent fuel into non-weaponizable reactor plates.
Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor
The agreement requires Iran not to activate its new small heavy water
research reactor in Arak. This small reactor was known to nuclear
inspectors for some time, but because it contained no fissile material,
it was not required to be monitored. The reactor was suddenly seized
upon by Israel and later by French Prime Minister François Hollande as a
“path to plutonium” — a massive over-reaction. This was quickly echoed
and exaggerated in the press. The
Christian Science Monitor suggested that this facility was in truth a “red herring” in the negotiations.
The reactor has faced considerable delays in construction and is not
scheduled to open until 2016. It will produce a small amount of
electricity, but it is designed to eventually supplement then replace
the TRR, producing medical isotopes. Plutonium can be extracted from
spent fuel rods, but only if there is a completely new facility
constructed to so this. Iran has no such facility. If Iran were to
decide to make a weapon from this extracted plutonium, it would then
need a third facility. Additionally, as former IAEA nuclear inspector
Robert Kelley
points out: ”the
reactor doesn’t do anything without fuel, and so if you don’t have
fuel, the reactor doesn’t run. If the reactor doesn’t run, it doesn’t
make plutonium.”
All of this time, the International Atomic Energy Agency would be
monitoring the use of the fissile material. Parallels with India,
Pakistan and Israel , who did use heavy-water reactors to extract
plutonium and build bombs are inaccurate, because as non-signatories to
the NPT, the actions of these nations were not monitored.
Building a Bomb?
There is a strange irony in President Obama’s announcement of the
temporary agreement. He mentioned the term “nuclear weapon” multiple
times in his announcement, implying that Iran was on a path to develop
such a weapon. One wonders if he actually believes this or if his
repeated implied accusation was a rhetorical device designed to placate
his hard-line critics.
The president must know by this time that there is no evidence that
Iran has or ever had a nuclear weapons program. Every relevant
intelligence agency in the world has verified this fact for more than a
decade. Two U.S. National Intelligence Estimates that were made public
in 2007 and 2011 underscored this. The International Atomic Energy
Agency has also consistently asserted that Iran has not diverted any
nuclear material for any military purpose.
Even Israeli intelligence analysts agree that Iran is “not a danger” to Israel. Typical is ex-Mossad chief
Efraim Halevy who said
on March 16 this year that Iran “will not make it to the bomb,” and
that Israel’s existence “is not in danger and shouldn’t be questioned.”
What Iran Gets in Return
Though Iran is not giving up very much in the November 23 agreement,
it is also not receiving a great deal in return. It will receive 6 to 7
billion dollars’ worth of sanctions relief, more than 4 billion of which
is money already owed to Iran in oil revenues, but frozen. In addition,
Iran has saved face; it did not give up on its inalienable right to
enrich uranium as guaranteed in the NPT. This may be enough to placate
hardliners in the Islamic Republic who have objected to dealings with
the United States and its allies in the past.
There will be some good feelings both in Washington and Tehran that
this astonishingly long impasse has finally been broken. Could either
side have gotten more from these talks? Probably not. In fact the
limited gains for both sides may well be a sign of the success of the
negotiations.
The vitriolic nay-sayers trying to torpedo these talks in both
capitals and elsewhere have been thwarted for the moment, but they will
certainly begin condemning this process immediately. However, leaders in
both nations should flatly ignore them. The world can only hope that
this small accord will lead to more substantive rapprochement in the
near future.